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I. Introduction 
 
The awakening of several Arab countries on the southern and 
eastern rims of the Mediterranean in the winter 2010-2011 raised 
concerns, particularly in European countries, about the migration 
flows it could engender. It was considered that political instability 
and the ensuing economic slowdown would be at the origin of 
large migration flows. A senior political figure in the European 
Union (EU) warned of migration flows of “Biblical dimensions”. 
The fact is that, despite some initial movements of contained 
magnitude in the spring 2011, the large flows did not materialize.1  
In the largest country on the southern rim, Egypt, repeated surveys 
among young Egyptians indicated the desire to migrate did not 
increase in the two years of political changes that followed the 
breakout of the Arab Awakening.2 
 
                                                 
1 Awad, I., 2013. The Arab Spring and Population Movements in the 
Mediterranean Region. In: Mediterranean Paper Series, 2013. Regional 
Dynamics in the Mediterranean and Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation. 
Washington: The German Marshall Fund of the United States and Istituto Affari 
Internazionali (IAI), pp. 13-24.  
2 Amed, M., Fargues, P., 2014. Labor Market Outcomes and Egypt's Migration 
Potential. In: Cairo Studies in Migration and Refugees, June Issue. Cairo: The 
American University in Cairo. Available at: <http://www.aucegypt.edu/ 
GAPP/cmrs/Documents/CMRS%20PAPER_No.6_labour%20market%20outcom
es.pdf. > [Accessed: 9 Oct 2014]. 
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Rather than towards the north, the Arab Awakening generated 
huge population movements at the East of the Mediterranean 
basin, within the Arab Near East region and in its immediate 
neighborhood. In Syria, revolts of large parts of the population 
against the political regime in power soon turned into an open civil 
strife. Refugee flows to bordering and neighboring countries 
started, first accelerated and then reached enormous proportions. 
Considering the sizes and volumes of the population of Syria and 
its bordering countries, the Syrian refugee crisis stands out as 
unprecedented, at least in recent history.  
 
The volumes of flows and their destinations deserve attention. 
They bring out the challenges the crisis raises concerning the 
ability of host countries to provide all the necessities for the needs 
and livelihoods of the Syrian refugees. They also bring to the 
surface its possible repercussions for the stability of host countries 
and of the whole regional state system.  
 
Possible repercussions for the stability of host countries, in 
turn, determined the policies of their governments and the 
reactions of their constitutive communities towards the Syrian 
refugees. In some countries, especially Jordan and Lebanon, 
demographic and political stability are intimately related.  
 
Inability to meet the needs of refugees threatened and 
compounded with the threats they constituted for host countries 
and for the region. International cooperation was the indicated 
instrument to buttress the means of these countries. Regional and 
external powers stepped in to provide financial resources to the 
host countries and to international intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations that assisted in meeting the needs of 
refugees for shelter, services and livelihoods. Through 
international cooperation, these powers were also expected to 
relieve the pressures on host countries by resettling a number of 
refugees in their territories.   
 
In reviewing volumes and distribution of Syrian refugees as 
well as policies and reactions in their respect of host countries and 
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communities and the regional and international response to the 
crisis, two assumptions are made. The first assumption is that 
historical and geographic factors interacted with states’ interests to 
fashion policies and reactions to the Syrian refugee crisis. The 
second assumption is that little international cooperation was a 
means to preserve the national interest of donor countries and, to 
some extent, that of host countries.   
 
 
II. Volumes and Distribution of Syrian Refugee Flows 
 
As soon as they broke out in spring 2011, the hostilities in the 
Syrian civil strife produced Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
and refugees. By the end of 2012, 647,000 refugees were 
distributed over Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey, as well as 
Egypt. In 2012, the flight of the Syrians was the largest annual 
exodus by a single refugee group since 1999. At the time, Syria 
itself was still hosting Iraqi refugees, estimated by the Syrian 
Government at 534,000.3 This was a smaller number of Iraqis than 
a year earlier. Some Iraqis had returned to their home country, 
which must have now looked to them as less violent than Syria, a 
perception obviously shared by those Syrians who had headed to 
Iraq. The growth rate of Syrian refugees was appallingly 
spectacular. Six months later, by mid-2013, their number reached 
1.9 million, among whom 1.8 million were assisted by UNHCR, 
in addition to 4.3 million IDPs. In that first half of 2013, from 
among the 1.3 million new refugees, Lebanon received 440,000, 
Jordan 390,000 and Turkey 290,000. During these six months, 
Syrians accounted for eight out of every 10 new refugees.4 Flows 
continued what seemed like their unstoppable growth. A year 
later, by June 2014, according to UNHCR estimates, total persons 
of concern to the agency had reached 2.8 million, among whom 
                                                 
3 UNHCR, 2013. Displacement, The New 21st Century Challenge. In: UNHCR 
Global Trends 2012.   Geneva: UNHCR. [pdf] Available at: < 
http://www.unhcr.org/51bacb0f9.html > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
4 UNHCR, 2013. Displacement, The New 21st Century Challenge. In: UNHCR 
Mid-Year Trends 2013.   Geneva: UNHCR, pp. 7,21. [pdf] Available at: < 
http://www.unhcr.org/52af08d26.html > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014].  
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some 70,000 were still unregistered. Lebanon hosted 1.1 million, 
Jordan 600,000, Iraq 220,000, Turkey 760,000 and Egypt 
140,000.5 
 
In UNHCR estimates, by mid-2013, Jordan and Lebanon were 
the third and fourth major refugee-hosting countries, after Pakistan 
and Iran.6 A year later, Lebanon overtook Iran,  as the second 
largest refugee-hosting country while Jordan remained in fourth 
place but approximating the third in terms of numbers of refugees.  
 
In accordance with the same estimates, by the end of 2012, 
Jordan was the first country in the world in terms of number of 
refugees per 1,000 inhabitants, at 49, well ahead of Chad, at 33. 
Lebanon ranked third with 32.7 With the growth in volumes of 
Syrian refugees in mid-2014, Lebanon moved to first place, with 
over 250 refugees per 1000 inhabitants, well ahead of the second, 
Jordan, with 88.8 
 
UNHCR estimates do not provide a complete picture of the 
situation. The configuration of the region, its history and the 
particular relations between its countries and their populations 
allow movements and stay without notifying hosting authorities. It 
is thus estimated that in Lebanon, in addition to the 1.1 million, 
some 600,000 to 750,000 have also taken refuge there, which 
would take the number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants there to 
360. Jordan, which is now second after Lebanon, was the first 
country in terms of number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants at the 
                                                 
5 UNHCR, 2014. Syria Regional Refugee Response. [online] Available at: <  
http://data.unhcr.org/ syrianrefugees/regional.php > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
6 UNHCR, 2013. Displacement, The New 21st Century Challenge. In: UNHCR 
Mid-Year Trends 2013.   Geneva: UNHCR, p 7. [pdf] Available at: < 
http://www.unhcr.org/52af08d26.html > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
7 UNHCR, 2013. Displacement, The New 21st Century Challenge. In: UNHCR 
Global Trends 2012.   Geneva: UNHCR, p. 15. [pdf] Available at: < 
http://www.unhcr.org/51bacb0f9.html > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
8 Calculations of the author. It is worth noticing that persons of concern to 
UNHCR in both Jordan and Lebanon do not include Palestinian refugees. 
Obviously, if these were accounted for, the numbers of refugees per 1,000 
inhabitants in Lebanon and Jordan would still be higher.   
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end of 2012, at 49. In Egypt, the government estimates the total 
number of Syrian refugees at 300,000. 
 
The volumes of refugees relative to the populations of host 
countries are sufficient to signal the enormous financial and 
economic burdens they constitute. These burdens, history, the 
power of states and the relations between communities determined 
their policies and reactions to the Syrian refugee flows.     
 
In the meantime, until January 2013, only about 64,000 Syrians  
had sought asylum in EU member states. These accounted for 2.4 
per cent of the total number of Syrians who had fled their country. 
From among the applications, 60 per cent had been made in 
Germany and Sweden.9 
 
 
III. State Policies and Community Reactions to the Syrian       
Refugee Crisis 
 
Historical and geographic factors seem to have interacted with 
the rationale of states’ interests to determine national policies 
towards the Syrian refugee crisis. The former factors look like 
having also fashioned community reactions to the crisis. 
 
Syria, Lebanon and Jordan are states of recent formation, 
which, independently of administrative partitions, constituted one 
political unit until the third decade in the 20th century. Syria and 
Lebanon became independent in 1943 and it is only past the 
middle of the century that the customs union between the two 
countries was broken. Iraq belonged to the same political 
extension. On either sides of the borders drawn up and put in place 
in the first decades of the last century, with the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, live the same communities and tribes. Turkey is 
                                                 
9 Chulov, M., Grant, H., 2014. Fortress Europe: Keeping Migrants Out at What 
Cost?, The Guardian, 13 Jan 2014, [online]. Available at < 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/13/syrian-refugee-catastrophe-
european-union-united-nations/print > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
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a regional power and a large part of inhabitants of its Hatay 
province, bordering with Syria, are Arabic speaking. Long claimed 
by the Syrian state, Hatay was, according to the French mandate 
and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the Liwa Iskanderoun part of 
Syria that was annexed by Turkey in 1939.10 
 
Although no policies were explicitly announced by Lebanon 
and Jordan regarding the Syrian refugee flows, the two countries 
kept their borders open. The territorial extension and community 
solidarities across borders made it natural for Syrians to seek 
refuge in Lebanon and Jordan. These same extension and 
solidarities would not allow any other policies by the two 
countries. The non-refoulement principle applied regardless of 
whether the entry of refugees was legal or illegal.11 In fact, the 
governments of Lebanon and Jordan were never on record as 
envisaging closing their borders. The reaction of receiving 
communities and the expectation of Syrians were determinants of 
their policies. “Most Lebanese expressed compassion and empathy 
for the refugees. Having painstakingly experienced with war, 
violence and instability, it has usually been the Lebanese seeking 
refuge in Syria and not the other way around. Lebanese 
particularly remember Syria’s hospitality during the war between 
Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. The time had come to give back and 
most Lebanese welcomed the opportunity”.12 Syrians’ 
                                                 
10 Lundgren Jörüm, E., 2014. Syria in Crisis: Syria's 'Lost Province': The Hatai 
Questions Returns. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 Jan 2014. 
[online] Available at: < http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54340 > 
[Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
11 Olwan, M., Shiyab, A., 2012. Forced Migration of Syrians to Jordan: An 
Exploratory Study. Migration Policy Centre Research Report, Issue: June 2012. 
San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies [pdf] Available at: < http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/ 
docs/MPC%202012%20EN%2006.pdf > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
12 Christophersen, M., Thorleifsson, C., Tiltnes A., 2013. Ambivalent 
Hospitality: Coping Strategies and Local Responses to Syrian Refugees in 
Lebanon. Fafo, Fafo-report 2013:48, p. 37. [pdf] Available at: < 
http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/20338/20338.pdf > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014].   
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expectations converged with the attitudes of the Lebanese.13  The 
existence of some 600,000 to 750,000 unregistered refugees in 
Lebanon, pointed out above, may be indicative of the informal and 
solidarity ties between communities on the two sides of the 
borders, which allow Syrians to live in Lebanon without notice to 
the authorities.   
 
However, empathy neither extended in time nor to all 
communities. The reactions of Lebanese communities to the 
refugee flows were as different as their attitudes toward the Syrian 
conflict and the various parties involved in the fighting. Christian 
and Shi’a Muslim communities were concerned about the arrival 
of Syrian refugees who, being mostly Sunni Muslims, would 
affect the demographic balance in their own country. Racist 
discourse was used against the refugees. In contrast, Sunni 
Muslims unwaveringly welcomed the fleeing Syrians. Contrasting 
attitudes could be seen as inputs in a policy-making process, the 
result of which was near paralysis and, in any case, an insufficient 
response by the government, which refrained from opening camps 
for the new refugees.14 All the same, it is important to emphasize 
anew that borders were kept open all along, which explains the 
continuous and high rates of growth of new arrivals.   
 
Despite the open border policy, the logic of state interest was 
present. The failure to explicitly articulate the open door policy 
can in itself be considered an attachment to state interest. When 
the revolt broke out, the Lebanese government in place at the time 
“adopted a policy of dissociation towards the conflict in Syria in 
                                                 
13 One Syrian refugee in Lebanon made the following comment: “We took care 
of our Lebanese brothers when they came to us in 2006, and today they are 
reciprocating this kindness”. See: Zaatari, M., 2012. Hezbollah offers healthcare 
to Syrian refugees. The Daily Star, Issue: 16 Dec 2012. [online] Available at: < 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Oct-01/189714-hezbollah-
offers-health-care-to-syrian-refugees.ash > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
14 Awad, I., 2013. The Arab Spring and Population Movements in the 
Mediterranean Region. In: Mediterranean Paper Series, 2013. Regional 
Dynamics in the Mediterranean and Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation. 
Washington: The German Marshall Fund of the United States and Istituto Affari 
Internazionali (IAI), p. 20. 
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an attempt to avoid a spill over into Lebanon.”15  It was as if 
refugees were only tolerated. The attitudes of Christian and Shi’a 
Muslim communities in Lebanon could also be explained by the 
wish to preserve the Lebanese state, made of delicate demographic 
equilibria, and not only by community sympathies. Another 
expression of attachment to state interest is the attitude towards 
the access of refugees to the labour market. In Jordan, refugees 
wishing to be employed need to have work permits, which is a 
natural prerogative of political entities that adopt the nation-state 
model. In Lebanon, some Lebanese considered that Syrians were 
stealing their jobs.16  
 
The logic of state interest is particularly seen in the treatment 
of Palestinians who joined the flows of refugees escaping violence 
in Syria. Again the delicate demographic equilibria between 
different religious communities in Lebanon and between Trans-
Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan needed to be maintained for 
the interests of the two states to be preserved.     
 
In Egypt, Syrian refugees were received with arms wide open. 
Syria and Egypt formed one state for three years from 1958 to 
1961. Syrian migration went back to the 19th century and Syrians 
had contributed to building the modern Egyptian state. The Syrian 
revolt and objectives of freedom and democracy were in line with 
the goals of Egypt’s uprising against former President Hosni 
Mubarak. As of July 2012, under Muslim Brother President 
Mohamed Mursi, the policy of welcoming Syrian refugees 
intensified. In addition to government action, faith-based 
organizations with links to the Muslim Brotherhood and others 
extended well needed services to the refugees.  However, when 
former President Mursi was removed from power, policy changed 
and support by community organizations was cut short. The new 
                                                 
15 Christophersen, M., Thorleifsson, C., Tiltnes A., 2013. Ambivalent 
Hospitality: Coping Strategies and Local Responses to Syrian Refugees in 
Lebanon. Fafo, Fafo-report 2013:48, p. 52. [pdf] Available at: < 
http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/20338/20338.pdf > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014].   
16 Ibid, p. 37. 
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authorities revoked the visa exemption for Syrians to enter Egypt. 
The visa requirement could be enforced for Syrians who almost 
entirely accessed Egypt through airports. A campaign of hostility 
and instigation against Syrian refugees was launched in the 
summer of 2013 and extended for a few months. Because a 
handful of refugees had sympathized with the deposed Mursi, all 
Syrian refugees were branded as allies of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The campaign against them was considered as aimed 
at preserving the national interest. History, geography, community 
ties and state interest fashioned Egyptian policy towards Syrian 
refugees from 2011 until the fall of the Muslim Brother 
presidency. Reinterpreted state interest determined it afterward. 
Narrowly defined national interest was behind the campaign of 
hostility and instigation in the summer and beginning of fall 
2013.17 A less crude understanding of national interest explains 
the reversal of hostile discourse against Syrian refugees starting in 
winter 2013-14.          
 
Turkey is party to the 1951 Convention on the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol but with a “geographical 
limitation” on their application.18 Turkey grants refugee status and 
the right to asylum only to persons who have become refugees as a 
result of events occurring in Europe. Like Lebanon and Jordan, 
Turkey also adopted an open border policy towards Syrians 
fleeing the conflict in their country. But these Syrians were not 
considered “refugees” but rather as guests. After starting processes 
aimed at registering Syrians arriving in Turkey in spring 2011, 
UNHCR stopped doing that on instructions from the Turkish 
government. One interpretation of the change in Turkish policy is 
that it was technically difficult to process applications for the huge 
number of asylum seekers that Syrians constituted. An alternative 
                                                 
17 State interest and national interest are here used interchangeably. On the 
campaign of hostility and instigation. See: Human Rights Watch, 2013. Egypt: 
Syria Refugees Detained, Coerced to Return. Human Rights Watch 11 Nov 2013. 
[online] Available at: < http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/10/egypt-syria-
refugees-detained-coerced-return > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
18 Egypt is also a party to the 1951 Convention, with reservations on the 
provision of services and access to employment. Lebanon and Jordan are not.  
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explanation is that with their new attitude, the Turkish authorities 
wished to prevent the interference by UNHCR or other 
international bodies with its approach towards the flows of Syrian 
refugees.19 Here policy towards Syria and Syrian refugees, 
reflecting the Turkish state interest, intersects with humanitarian 
considerations. The reversal of a decade-old rapprochement 
between authorities in the two countries when the conflict broke 
out in Syria reveals a redefinition of Turkey's national interest.      
 
The open border policies of bordering states contrasted with 
those of the European neighbourhood. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees found it disconcerting that while 
countries close to the conflict were asked to keep their borders 
open, “many Syrians were struggling to find protection in Europe, 
with reports of people being pushed back from a number of 
borders. And all this is happening although the overall number is 
small in comparison – Turkey alone has received 10 times the 
number of Syrian refugees as all EU member states together.” 20 
The EU was reported to have applied pressure on Turkey to keep 
its borders open but worked quickly to create a network of fences, 
patrols and policies to keep the Syrian refugees from entering 
Europe. Millions were spent on border controls between Turkey 
and Greece.21 It is as if without the common historical and 
geographical factors connecting Syria to its bordering and other 
regional countries, the only remaining determinant of policy in the 
countries of the European neighbourhood was national interest 
defined as preserving their territories and economic opportunities 
for their populations and chosen groups of migrants. 
                                                 
19 On the Syrian refugees in Turkey, policy in their respect and services provided 
to them. See: Özden, S., 2013. Syrian Refugees in Turkey. Migration Policy 
Centre Research Report, Issue: Mai 2013. San Domenico di Fiesole: European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies [pdf] 
Available at: < http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC-RR-2013-05.pdf  
> [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
20 Chulov, M., Grant, H., 2014. Fortress Europe: Keeping Migrants Out at What 
Cost?, The Guardian, 13 Jan 2014, [online]. Available at < 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/13/syrian-refugee-catastrophe-
european-union-united-nations/print > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
21 Ibid. 
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IV. International Cooperation in Facing up to the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis 
 
Syrian refugees have needs for protection, shelter and services, 
such as education, health, water and sanitation. The financial and 
delivery capacities of host countries are far from being adequate to 
meet these needs. Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt have their own 
economic problems. Analysis made by the World Bank at the 
beginning of 2014 provides labour market and economic 
indicators for the burden Syrian refugees represent for Lebanon, 
by far the largest hosting country.  The World Bank forecasted 
that Lebanon’s unemployment rate might nearly double in 2014, 
reaching 20 per cent, putting 220,000 to 340,000 Lebanese out of 
work and potentially pushing an additional 170,000 Lebanese into 
poverty. It pointed out that recent assessments are signaling an 
annual reduction in GDP growth by 2.9 per cent since the crisis 
began. The Bank further estimated that the total economic impact 
of the crisis on the Lebanese economy would reach $7.5 billion, 
equivalent to 18 per cent of Lebanese GDP, by the end of 2014.22  
 
International cooperation could not serve in finding a political 
solution to the Syrian conflict, in addressing its causes or in 
stopping it. It could be used to relieve the pressures the refugees 
constitute for host countries and to help them to meet the refugees' 
needs. Actual international cooperation used two instruments, of 
which the first is the pledges for resettlement, humanitarian 
admission and private sponsorships by countries. Actual 
disbursement of financial assistance aimed at helping host 
countries to provide for the needs of the refugees constitutes the 
second instrument.  
 
Pledges for resettlement, humanitarian admission and private 
sponsorships fell short of needs for protection of the most 
                                                 
22 UNHCR, 2014. Update on the High-Level Segment on Solidarity and Burden-
Sharing with Countries Hosting Syrian Refugees. In: 59th Meeting of the 
Standing Committee, 4-6 March 2014. Geneva: UNHCR. [pdf] Available at: < 
http://www.unhcr.org/5319de7e9.pdf > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014].  
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vulnerable refugees, let alone of relieving the population pressures 
the host countries were under. In fall 2013, UNHCR issued a call 
for 30,000 places for such refugees until the end of 2014.23 By the 
end of 2013, it had received pledges for 15,250 places only. The 
European neighbourhood offered 13,500 places, among which 
12,350 came from member states of the EU. These places were 
equivalent to some 0.6 per cent of Syrian refugees at the time. The 
vast majority of places, 10,000, were offered by Germany. The 
remaining 27 EU countries pledged 2,340 places. Eighteen EU 
member states, including the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy, did 
not make any resettlement or admission pledges.24 To be sure, 
these attitudes were not the preserve of the EU. Countries of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council did not offer any resettlement or 
humanitarian admission places to refugees from Syria. Australia 
and Canada offered 500 and 1,300 places. The United States did 
not announce a determined number leaving it open-ended.25   
 
The shortcomings of the first instrument of international 
cooperation in facing up to the Syrian refugee crisis are obvious. It 
looked as if the concentration was on financial assistance, the 
second instrument of international cooperation. It could be said 
that extra-regional parties26 of the international system acted as if 
asking receiving countries to keep the Syrian refugees against 
                                                 
23 UNHCR, 2013. Finding Solutions for Syrian Refugees: Resettlement, 
Humanitarian Admission and Family Reunification, 18 Oct 2013. Geneva: 
UNHCR. [pdf] Available at: < http://unhcr.org.uk/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/docs/Fact_sheet_on_resettlement-
humanitarian_admissions_Syrian_refugees.pdf?j=11002&e= 
indianschona@yahoo.co.uk&l=462_HTML&u=742172&mid=6192421&jb=0&u
tm_source=UKmonthly-e-news-Jan2014&utm_medium=email&utm_t 
erm=003D000001Q7NWdIAN&utm_content=button1_appeal& utm_campaign 
> [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
24 Amnesty International, 2013. An International Failure: The Syrian Refugee 
Crisis. Amnesty International Briefing, 13 Dec 2013. [pdf] Available at: < 
http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/ACT34/001/2013/en/ 8a376b76-d031-
48a6-9588-ed9aee651d52/act340012013en.pdf > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
25 Ibid. 
26 The region meant here is the Near East encompassing the host countries of 
Syrian refugees. It does not extend to the whole Arab world. 
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providing them with financial assistance. International cooperation 
could then be seen as a means to preserve the national interests of 
extra-regional powers and to assist host countries in protecting 
theirs. The question that arises is whether the second instrument of 
international cooperation was sufficiently deployed so as to help 
host countries protect their state interests, which were deemed 
served with the provision of services and means of livelihoods to 
the Syrian refugees. The actual delivery of services and provision 
of means of livelihood was left to international intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) and to international and national non-
governmental organizations (INGOs and NGOs).   
 
International intergovernmental organizations such as UNHCR, 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) played crucial roles in assisting 
host countries, especially in Lebanon and Jordan, to meet the 
needs of the Syrian refugees. International NGOs, such as the 
Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children, the Danish 
Refugee Council, the Qatari and United Arab Emirates (UAE) red 
crescents, Caritas and many others, complemented the work of 
international intergovernmental organizations and brought their 
own funds.27 
 
As the first two years of the crisis unfolded, donations of public 
funds were made by the European Commission and a number of 
EU member states, such as Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK. Donors also included 
Australia, Brazil, Korea, Switzerland and the United States. 
Amongst Arab countries, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
                                                 
27 Awad, I., 2013. The Arab Spring and Population Movements in the 
Mediterranean Region. In: Mediterranean Paper Series, 2013. Regional 
Dynamics in the Mediterranean and Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation. 
Washington: The German Marshall Fund of the United States and Istituto Affari 
Internazionali (IAI), p. 22. 
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UAE made donations. Nevertheless, financial support fell far short 
of actual needs.28 
 
To remedy the shortage, Kuwait convened two international 
pledging conferences in January 2013 and 2014. Pledges were 
sought to meet the needs of both refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) who had remained in Syria. At the first conference, 
the revised United Nations appeal was for US$ 4.4 billion. 
Participating countries and a consortium of NGOs pledged US$ 
1.5 billion, or 34 per cent of the appeal. One year later, only 
around 70 per cent of the pledges had reached the UN. In January 
2014, at the second conference, the UN appeal was for US$ 6.4 
billion. New donors came forward but pledges amounted to US$ 
2.4 billion only, or 38 per cent of the appeal. Rates of response in 
the two conferences were almost similar and far removed from the 
needs identified by the United Nations. In view of the question of 
actual disbursement, in his opening address to the second Kuwait 
conference, the Secretary General urged donors to ensure that 
pledges are met.29 Yet, by April 2014, some 45 per cent only of 
the pledges made three months earlier had been fulfilled.30 In 
February 2014, rates of effective coverage of the appeals made by 
UNHCR in favor of host countries were 15 per cent for Jordan, 14 
per cent for Lebanon, 11 per cent for Iraq, 8 per cent for Egypt and 
6 per cent for Turkey.31 The shortfalls speak for themselves. They 
are particularly important for Jordan and Lebanon given the very 
                                                 
28 Ibid.  
29 Osborne, A., 2014. Syria pledging conference: who promised what?. Global 
Humanitarian Assistance. [online] Available at < 
http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/Syria-pledging-conference-who-
promise-what-4951.html > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. Westall, S., Strobel, W., 
Western, Arab states pledge $2.4 billion in Syria aid. Reuters 15 Jan 2014. 
[online] Available at: < http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/01/15/us-syria-
crisis-aid-idUSBREA0E0C620140115 > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014].        
30 OCHA, 2014. UN welcomes Kuwait donation, massive gaps still remain. 
OCHA. [online] Available at: < www.unocha.org/top-stories/syria-un-welcomes-
kuwaiti-donation-massive-gaps-still-remain > [Accessed 9 Oct 2014]. 
31 UNHCR, 2014. Syria Regional Refugee Response. UNHCR. [online] 
Available at: < http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional/php > [Accessed 9 
Oct 2014]. 
 37
high number of Syrians, who have taken refuge in the two 
countries, their limited resources and the relatively small volumes 
of their economies.  
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Historical and geographic factors interacted with state security 
concerns to determine policies and attitudes towards the Syrian 
refugee crisis. Analysis reveals that as the effect of historical and 
geographic factors waned with distance, state or national interest 
remained as the primary determinant of policy. Tension existed 
between the two sets of determinants in countries bordering Syria. 
However, the situation of these countries in the same geographical 
extension and the solidity of historical and cultural ties between 
their populations and communities could only result in open 
border policies. They also explain the warm reception of refugees 
by some communities. But state interests were also present. 
Access to labour markets was kept for citizens. Some communities 
felt apprehensive about the demographic equilibria that, for them, 
the refugees threatened. Hate and racist discourse were means to 
express the apprehension. The Palestinians among the flows of 
refugees from Syria were particularly affected, as often before, by 
concerns over demographic equilibria. Lebanon, Jordan and 
Turkey are counted among the bordering countries.   
 
Egypt has significant historical ties with Syria but is 
geographically removed from it. Links between populations are 
not comparable to those existing between communities in Syria, 
on the one hand, and in Lebanon and Jordan, on the other. This, in 
addition to state interest concerns, could explain the about-face of 
Egyptian open door policy after July 2013. However, the historical 
ties and the very same, but reinterpreted, national interest were 
behind the watering down of the change in policy.  
 
Getting even further from the epicenter of the Syrian refugee 
crisis, national interest becomes the primordial if not the only 
determinant of policy. International cooperation does not relieve 
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the pressures that the physical presence of refugees constitutes for 
host countries to any significant extent. It almost entirely takes the 
form of financial assistance to these host countries to help them 
meet the needs of refugees. International cooperation becomes a 
means to preserve the national interest of donor countries. In this 
specific instance, national interest seems to have been defined as 
keeping refugees at arm’s length. By aiming at helping in meeting 
the needs of refugees, without impairing the rights and privileges 
of citizens, international cooperation is also meant to assist host 
countries to protect their state interests. However, the actual 
volume of international cooperation was far short of needs. It did 
not significantly reduce the threats to state security that demands 
of refugees and citizens represented for the limited resources of 
host countries. 
 
Refugees from Syria constituted the largest population 
movement in the aftermath of the Arab Awakening in 2011. Flows 
of refugees remained in the bordering and adjacent region. This 
situation is comparable to other previous refugee crises in different 
parts of the world. International cooperation did not rise up to the 
challenges the new crisis raised. It remained confined to the logic 
of national interest. This is at a time when refugee flows 
responded to solidarities that transcended both borders and the 
very same logic of national interest.          
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